Abstract-Muli-hop cellular network is a promising network architecture which incorporates the ad hoc characteristic into the cellular system aiming to improve current cellular network performance. Unlike single hop cellular network, due to involving autonomous devices in packet forwarding, routing process suffers from new security challenges which endanger the practical implementation of the network. One security challenge is that selfish devices do not relay other nodes' packets because cooperation consumes their resources and does not provide any immediate advantages. Selfish nodes degrade the network throughput, connectivity and power consumption. In order to stimulate the nodes' cooperation, we propose a micro-payment mechanism to reward the forwarding nodes and charge the communicating ones. The security analysis shows that the proposed mechanism is robust against rational attacks, and it can thwart some irrational ones. To evaluate the cost of applying our mechanism, an implementation model is proposed. The performance analysis based on the implementation model demonstrates that the overhead is acceptable.
I. INTRODUCTION
Multi-hop cellular network (MCN) [1] [2] [3] [4] is a network architecture which incorporates the ad hoc characteristic into the cellular system. The communication packets are relayed through the intermediate nodes. The nodes commit bandwidth, data storage, CPU cycles, battery power, etc., forming a pool of resources which can be used by all of them. The utility which nodes can obtain from the pooled resources is much higher than they can obtain on their own.
Many benefits are expected from MCN [5] [6] [7] [8] . The power consumption of the mobile devices and the interference between the nodes can be reduced because the signal transmission distances are shorter. Since the coverage area of the base station increases, the capacity of the cells can be increased. However, although the successful routing operation requires the users to collaborate, collaboration is not individually beneficial for the users because it consumes their resources.
Extensive attentions have been paid on selfish nodes problem. The proposed mechanisms fall into one of two categories, namely, reactive and preventive. In reactive mechanisms [9] [10] [11] , a reputation system is used to identify and punish selfish nodes. In preventive mechanisms, forwarding other nodes' packets is considered a service. Therefore, originators and/or receivers pay (real or virtual money) to the intermediate nodes. Reactive mechanisms suffer from the following drawbacks: unreliable detection of the selfish nodes because it is difficult to differentiate between the nodes' unwilling to cooperate and their inability to cooperate due to low resources. In addition, these mechanisms force the users (the owners of their devices) to serve the network and punish them, if they did not cooperate, no matter how they have previously contributed to the network. Therefore, we believe that preventive mechanisms are more appropriate for commercial networks.
In this paper, we propose a micropayment mechanism to stimulate the nodes to cooperate. The mechanism does not require tamper proof device to be installed in each node. It also does not require an online, interactive authority to be involved in communication activity. In sending the payment proofs for redemption, the mechanism balances the security and performance. Several measures have been taken to guarantee the efficient implementation to the mechanism. Our security analysis shows that it is robust against rational attacks. The performance analysis shows that the overhead is acceptable.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: section II provides the network and adversary models. Section III presents the related work. A new cooperation incentive mechanism for hybrid and ad hoc modes are presented at sections IV and V. Some improvements are shown at section VI. Security and performance analyses are given in sections VII and VIII, followed by the conclusion in section IX.
II. PRELIMINARY

A. The Network Model
MCN includes a trusted party (TP), a set of base stations (BSs) and mobile nodes (MNs). The trusted party issues and revokes the private/ public keys for the network entities. It also contains the accounting center (AC) that stores the accounts of the network entities. The base stations are powerful parties that are distributed in large geographic area. They are connected with each other and with the trusted party by a secure and fast backbone network. The exchanged messages between the mobile nodes and the trusted party are relayed by the base stations. The mobile nodes have limited storage and power resources. Each node is registered with a legitimate operator and stores a public/private key pair with a certificate issued from the trusted party. They also store the public key of the trusted party. Unlike current single hop cellular networks, the nodes can communicate in ad hoc or hybrid modes. In ad hoc mode, the nodes communicate without involving any infrastructure. Packets are relayed hop by hop from an originator to a destination node through the intermediate nodes. In hybrid mode, mobile nodes can not communicate without involving at least one base station.
B. Adversary and Trust Models
Because the mobile nodes are autonomous, we assume that an attacker has a full control on his mobile node. It can change its operation and infer the cryptographic materials. Attackers can work individually or collude with each other to share information to launch more sophisticated attacks. We assume attackers are rational; their objective is to maximize their own benefits from the network. For the base stations, as opposed to other related mechanisms such as [12] , which assume they are fully trusted, we consider them rational attackers. They may only cheat to increase their accounts or their subscribers' accounts but they do not disrupt the network operation. Our assumption is reasonable because they are owned by different providers who are motivated to cheating. For the trust models, all the network nodes fully trust the trusted party to correctly perform billing and auditing. The trusted party does not trust any entity in the network. The mobile nodes trust the base stations but not each other. Base stations do not trust the users.
III. RELATED WORK M. Jakobsson et al. [12] proposed a cooperation incentive mechanism for MCNs. The packets' originators append a payment token to the transmitted packets. To reduce the overhead, the mechanism uses a probabilistic payment technique, where the forwarding nodes check whether the token corresponds to a winning ticket. Although relaying other nodes' packets consume the node's resources, the nodes may not receive their deserved payments. Colluders can intercept and exchange collected tokens to be checked locally in each node to gain credits without contributing in the network. Nuglets mechanism [13] requires a tamper proof device to be installed in each node to store the credits counter. The selfgenerated and forwarding packets are passed to the device which decreases or increases the counter, respectively. Secure devices may be expensive. Also, if they are compromised, the security system breaks down, and it is difficult to detect that. In Sprite mechanism [14] , when a node receives a message, it stores a receipt and transmits it to a central authority. Although both the communicating nodes benefit from the communication, just the sender pays. A node is not rewarded, if the successor does not report a valid receipt of the message. The receipts are issued individually, so the number of the receipts is large, and the receipt redemption overwhelms the network.
For the mechanism proposed in [15] , the packet originator appends a signature to the full path identities and an initialization of a keyed hash chain. Each intermediate node verifies the signature and computes a new hash value using the attached hash value and its session key. This extra task may degrade its performance. In CASHnet mechanism [16] , users regularly visit service points to buy traffic credits which are used to forward self-generated packets, and/or to transfer helper credits, which are gained from relaying other nodes' packets, to traffic credits. The sender pays full payment for every generated packet, even if it does not reach the destination node. The intermediate nodes are not rewarded, if the packet does not reach the destination node, or if a control packet is dropped. For SIP (Secure Incentive Protocol) [17] , in order to reward the intermediate nodes, the destination node sends a payment receipt to the originator that issues a REWARD packet which increments the intermediate nodes credit counters. The intermediate nodes are not rewarded (or rewarded less), if the packet does not reach the destination node. Each packet needs three trips between the source and destination nodes.
IV. DSC: INCENTIVE MECHANISM FOR HYBRID MODE
A. Route Discovery Phase
A route discovery protocol should be used to infer the optimal route. After choosing a route, an end to end session is established, and the originator knows the identities and the relaying prices of the intermediate nodes. In addition, the intermediate nodes know the public keys of the source and destination nodes. The detail of the routing protocol is outside the scope of this paper.
B. Packet Generation Phase
The source node initiates a series of packets by attaching a signature to the payment data (PD), which is an approval from one payer to the transaction. The payment data consist of the identities of the nodes on the route and their relaying prices. It also contains the ratio of payment between the source and destination nodes, time stamp and the last hash value (SH) of a hash chain generated from iteratively hashing a nonce. The hash chain is used to improve the network performance by generating one cheque for a series of packets. It also reduces the packet overhead because the size of the hash value is much less than the signature size. It reduces the end to end delay because the computational time for hashing is much less than signing.
For the successive packets in the series, the originator sends one hash value (EH) in a reverse order for each message as an approval to pay for one more packet with the same data payment. The payer can not deny generating the payment because it is difficult to compute EH from SH. the source node initiates a new packet series (with a new cheque) when any item of the payment data changes, or the route is broken.
C. Packet Forwarding Phase
Before an intermediate node forwards a packet, it verifies the signature and time stamp. For the successive packets in the series, the node checks whether the hash value SH is generated from hashing EH. In case of the first packet in a series, every intermediate node composes and stores the single signature cheque (SSC) as a proof of receiving the packet. As shown in Fig. (1-a) , the cheque consists of the payment data (PD) and hash (H()) to the originator's signature (sig s ), where '|' means concatenation. Storing a hash value instead of the signature dramatically reduces the cheque size. SSC is used to claim the payment, if the packet does not reach the destination node. In case of successive packets in a series, each node composes aggregated double signature cheque with a single signature cheque (ADSC_S(i)). The cheque contains payment date for (i-1) successfully sent packets and one relayed packet. The format of ADSC_S(i) is the same as ADSC shown in figure  (1-C) , but the destination signature is for the hash before the last one. The evolution of the cheques is shown in figure (2 
D. Packet Reception Phase
The destination node verifies the signature (or the hash value) and the time stamp. It sends ACK packet with its signature on the payment data (or the hash value). The signature is an approval from the second payer to the transaction. The mechanism can be more optimized by sending ACK for a group of packets.
E. ACK/NACK Reception Phase
In case of the first ACK in a series, an intermediate node upgrades the SSC to DSC which is a proof of successfully delivering the packet. As shown in Fig. (1-b) , DSC includes the payment data and the hash of the signatures of both the sender and receiver. For ACK from successive packets, the intermediate nodes aggregate the payment by composing aggregated double signature cheque (ADSC). As shown in Fig. (1-c) , in the aggregated cheque the latest hash chain EH
to uncooperative state or change its price, it piggybacks a notice to the ACK. The mechanism allows the nodes to change their prices to more stimulate them to cooperate. For instance, in case of low resources, a node may increase its price instead of transition to un-cooperation state. The source node re-establishes the route when it receives NACK.
F. Payment Redemption Phase
The base stations transmit the session cheques to the AC. Once the AC receives a cheque, it first uses the cheque unique identifier (ID s |ID d |TS) to check that it has not been deposited before. Then, it verifies the hash of the payers' signatures. Finally, it clears the cheque by crediting the source and destination nodes with the listed ratios, and rewarding the participating nodes. The AC sends clearance confirmation messages to the nodes, showing the identifiers of the cleared cheques. After receiving the messages, the nodes delete the cleared cheques. If the nodes do not receive the clearance confirmation during a certain time, they claim the cheques.
V. DSC FOR PURE AD HOC MODE
For ad hoc mode, the proposed mechanism for hybrid mode can be used. However, because the base station is not involved in the communication, the nodes have to transmit the session cheques later when they have a connection to a base station. Every cheque contains complete payment information for all the session nodes, so it is sufficient to send it once. However, we can not trust one node to send the cheques because it may collude with the payers. In addition, it is not efficient to let all the nodes send all the cheques. In this section, we propose two efficient and secure techniques to transmit the cheques to AC. In our performance evaluation to the techniques, we consider two metrics: the total number of transmitted cheques and the required storage space in each node. For the security evaluation, we consider one metric which is the effect of collusion on the number of transmitted cheques. It is obvious as these metrics decrease, as it is better.
A. Deterministic Technique
In this technique, each node sends a unique and equal share of the session cheques. The technique is efficient because each cheque is stored and transmitted once, and the load is distributed evenly among the nodes. However, it has two security concerns: first, colluders know their profits in advance because each cheque is supposed to be sent by one node. This may be an incentive to cheating. Second concern is that the number of transmitted cheques is sensitive to the number of colluders, especially at small number of intermediate nodes.
B. Probabilistic Technique
In this technique, each node sends a randomly chosen share (j) of the cheques. One cheque may be sent by more than one node. The technique guarantees with a certain probability that a minimum number of the cheques will be sent. It achieves adaptive performance and security because increasing (j) improves the security but degrades the performance. It has two 
ADSC
PD| EH| H(H(Sig s (PD))| Sig d (PD)| Sig d (EH))
main security advantages: colluders do not know their profits in advance because they do not know the chosen cheques by the other nodes; the honest nodes can take preventive measures to protect the system up to a certain number of colluders. Fig. (3) shows the relation between the ratio of transmitted cheques (PR) and the probability of sending at least q cheques; where PR=j/i, and (i) is the total number of the session cheques. Q is an integer random variable which defines the number of unrepeated transmitted cheques. We assume the number of intermediate nodes (n) is 10 and i =100. The nodes choose (j) to achieve a certain probability of sending a minimum number of cheques. As shown in the figure, it is not worth to choose the operating point at the first region (0%-10%) or the last region (90%-100%) because the effect of changing PR on the probability is very little. The optimal operating point should be around 90%. Therefore, the nodes choose (j) to guarantee that the probability of sending at least 90% of the cheques, is at least 90%. Fig. (4) shows that the honest nodes can take preventive measures against colluders by calculating PR to protect the technique up to a number of colluders, that is called "adaptive security". At PR=0.3, it is guaranteed that up to two colluders the probability of receiving at least 90% of the cheques is at least 91.7%, so it is protected up to 2 colluders.
VI. PROPOSED IMPROVEMENTS
In this section, we discuss some simple modifications to improve the performance and security of the mechanism.
A. Cheques Aggregation
Reducing the number of cheques lessens the required storage space, bandwidth and power. It also improves the payment processing. Therefore, cheques can be aggregated together, where each cheque sums up the payment information for a group of the last issued cheques. In order to prevent cheaters from double clearing a cheque, individual and aggregated cheques should have the same unique identifier. In other aggregation scenario, payment proofs (the hashes) can be aggregated by hashing them.
B. Fixed Price
Changing the nodes' relaying prices may lead to changing the session route and generating new packet series, which degrades the network performance. In order to alleviate this problem, payers can agree on fixed prices for one session or for a number of packets.
C. Reducing the Packet Size
The packet overhead can be reduced by using session and packet sequence numbers instead of the routes' identities. The session number can be derived from the participating node identities, e.g. ID 1 XOR ID 2 … XOR ID n .
D. Detecting the Missed Cheques
Some cheques may be missed due to colluding or misbehaving actions. The mechanism can be modified to add a serial number to each cheque. Therefore, AC can detect and clear the missed cheques, but because the actual payment information is unknown, it can average the session cheques.
VII. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this Section, we study the robustness of the proposed mechanism against some common attacks.
A. Free Calling (or Riding) Attacks
Attackers launch this attack in order to communicate for free or with reduced payment. If the payers pay only when a packet reaches the destination node, attackers collude with an intermediate node to claim that the packet is dropped and then deliver it secretly. In another scenario, if the intermediate nodes are unable to verify the payment information, payers exchange packets which will not be rewarded for. Our mechanism is secure against these attacks because if a packet does not reach the destination node, the intermediate nodes can claim the SSCs. The intermediate nodes are able to verify the payment data and drop the packet, if the verification fails.
Payers may try to reduce their payments by colluding with some intermediate nodes not to transmit the cheques to AC. To evaluate the effectiveness of this attack, we run a simulation to measure the effect of collusion on the ratio of un-sent cheques with assuming i=100. The results are shown in Fig. (5) . In deterministic technique, the effect of collusion is nearly linear with a weight of 0.01% for each colluding node. The probabilistic technique improves the ratio of un-sent cheques. Therefore, to prevent sending a significant ratio of the cheques, an attacker has to collude with a large number of nodes, which is not reasonable in such scalable networks. Even if an attacker could prevent sending a group of cheques, the nodes can claim them, and AC can identify the attackers by applying some statistical analysis. 
B. Modification of Payment Data Attacks
A misbehaving node may compromise the payment data to gain more credits or to pay less. It may add its identity or/and a friend's identity claiming that they participated in packet forwarding. In the proposed mechanism, the payment data are signed by the payers, so modifying them is difficult. In addition, it is difficult to compute a previous hash value in a hash chain. Payees can detect any misbehaving actions because they can verify the payment data.
C. Double Rewarding Attack
A greedy node may try to clear a valid cheque more than one time, or it tries to replay valid packets claiming that they are fresh to gain undeserved rewards. AC can detect this attack and identify the attackers because each cheque has a unique number. The nodes can detect replayed packets from TS.
D. Denial of Payment Attack
Payers may deny initiating previous communication so as not to pay, or they may deny the payment information. In the proposed mechanism, payers sign the payment information.
E. Payment Collecting Attack
Attackers collect payments for each other for sessions in which they did not participate by claiming that they have nonexistent neighbor(s). To launch this attack, colluders need to exchange their private keys for authentication. Extracting the keys from the mobile device is not supposed easy. Moreover, exchanging the keys is not likely to happen because colluders can steal the accounts of each other. Inserting non-existent nodes decreases the chance to be selected in the session route due to increasing the total cost. However, AC can detect and identify the attackers by applying some statistics. It can detect that some nodes are always neighbors or participate in two sessions at the same time.
F. Forwarding only the Cheques Attack
Colluders forward the cheques (smaller size) but not the payload, and then they claim the SSCs aiming to gain money with minimum resources. To thwart this attack, Sprite [14] greatly reduces the amount of credits given to the intermediate nodes, if the packet does not reach the destination node, regardless, if the route is broken due to malicious or nonmalicious actions. In our mechanism, AC can detect the attack by applying statistical analysis to infer that some nodes are always neighbors and claim SSCs more than the normal rate.
G. Dropping Control Packets Attack
Although control packets (such as ACK and NACK) are short, some rational attackers may drop them to save their resource. In our mechanism, the nodes are fully motivated to forward them to gain more credits by triggering the source node to generate more packets, and to deliver the cheques to the base station to get their credits.
H. Irrational Attacks
Although the main objective of the mechanism is to thwart the rational attacks, it can detect some irrational ones. Replay attack is detectable due to using a signed time stamp. By statistical analysis, the AC can detect the personating attacks by noticing that the same user has participated in two different sessions at the same time, or it appears at different locations in a short time. AC can identify the attackers launching packet dropping attack by noticing that their preceding nodes claim more SSCs than the normal rate.
VIII. EVALUATION AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
The proposed mechanism is scalable because it does not require instantaneous contacting to AC in each session. Several measures have been taken to improve the efficiency of the payment system. Reducing the number and size of the cheques lessens the required storage, energy and bandwidth. A cheque includes payment data for all the session nodes instead of a cheque for each node. Technique to aggregate the cheques is proposed. The cheque size is very compact due to storing the hash of the signatures, but more overhead is required by AC to verify the signatures. This is not a problem because online clearance is not required, and AC is a powerful party.
Although symmetric key cryptography is faster and requires less resource, in our application, public key cryptography is more appropriate because payers can not deny the payment. In symmetric key cryptography, the relaying nodes may not be able to check the validity of the payment information which allows the attackers to launch several attacks. The mechanism avoids exhausting the nodes' resource. Unlike [12] , invalid packets do not propagate through the network because nodes can verify the validity of the payment data. The compact and aggregated cheques do not consume much resource. The hash chain technique is used to reduce the packet overhead.
To determine the expected overhead from implementing our mechanism, we run a simulation to measure the average number of intermediate nodes. We assume the network size is 500m X 500m with densities of 50 and 100 nodes. The coverage areas of the base station and the nodes are 150m and 75m, respectively. In Ad hoc mode, the average numbers of intermediate nodes are 3.24 and 4.55 at low and high densities, respectively. In hybrid mode, the average numbers of intermediate nodes are 5.57 and 6.93 at low and high densities, respectively. According to NIST [18] guidelines on choosing the public keys sizes, the least security level is 80 bits. Therefore, in our implementation model, we consider two types of the public key cryptography: RSA (1024 bits) and ECNR (168 bits). For the hash function we use MD5 because it is commonly used, efficient and secure; it also has a short digest length (16 bytes). In our mechanism, the major online processing overhead is due to signing and verifying operations to the payment information. Therefore, in order to estimate the additional overhead of applying our mechanism, we have implemented a prototype of our system using the Crypto++5 library [19] . The mobile node is a laptop with an Intel processor at 1.6 GHZ and 1 GB Ram. The OS of the mobile node is Windows XP. The resources of the real mobile nodes may be less than a laptop but the results can be scaled to give estimation to the expected overhead. For RSA, the signature and verification times are 15.63ms and 0.53ms, respectively. For ECNR, the signature and verification times are 5.75ms and 9.71ms. The hashing speed is 57.710 Mbytes/Second.
The additional overhead of applying our mechanism is shown in Table ( 1). The average computational time due to using RSA is less than ECNR because the verification time in RSA is much less. The effect of the network density on the expected delay is negligible. The table shows that the aggregation technique dramatically reduces the computational time. This large reduction is due to the low computational time of the hash functions compared to signature. For the storage space, the main concern is the required space for storing the cheques. The results show that the cheque size is very compact due to hashing the payers' signatures. The average cheque size is 90 bytes compared to 180 in Sprite [14] . A small storage of 1MiB can store up to 11,650 cheques. The major packet overhead is due to the digital signature. IX. CONCLUSION In this paper, we have proposed a new cooperation incentive mechanism for MCNs. We have taken several measures to guarantee the efficient implementation to the mechanism. We have also proposed techniques to transmit the payment proofs that balance the security and performance. Our security analysis shows that the mechanism is robust against rational attacks and, it can thwart some irrational ones. The performance evaluation shows that the overhead is acceptable. In the future, we will do simulations to measure the network performance metrics such as the throughput and the delay.
